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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue presented for review in this appeal is
whether the court below erred in holding that out-of-state
defendants who had no contact with Utah except to cause
intentional injury to a Utah resident are not subject to
personal jurisdiction in this state.

The trial court's ruling

on this issue represents a conclusion of law subjected to
de novo review on appeal. Anderson v. American Soc. of Plastic
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal is controlled by the provisions of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-27-22 and 24 (Rep. Vol. 9 1992) and the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provisions are set forth in their entirety
in the addendum to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Third District
Court dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a Utah resident who alleged that the
defendants, all California residents, made false allegations to
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California law enforcement authorities with the intent to cause
injury to plaintiff at a time when defendants knew plaintiff
was living in Utah.

The complaint further alleged that as a

result of defendants' false statements, plaintiff was
wrongfully arrested in Utah and incurred economic and emotional
damages, including injury to her reputation.
All of the defendants' conduct complained of by
plaintiff occurred in California, and defendants are not
subject in general jurisdiction in the Courts of Utah.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah's long-arm statute provides that an individual
submits himself to jurisdiction in Utah's courts by causing an
injury within this state.

The Act further provides that it is

to be interpreted and applied so as to permit exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted
by the United States Constitution.

The United States Supreme

Court has previously recognized that a defendant who
intentionally causes injury in a foreign state has no
legitimate constitutional objection to the exercise of
jurisdiction over him by that foreign state even if all his
wrongful conduct occurred outside of that state.

Accordingly,

defendants' objection to the exercise of jurisdiction in this
action should have been rejected, and the court below erred in
granting the motion to dismiss.
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ARGUMENT
ONE WHO INTENTIONALLY CAUSES INJURY TO A
RESIDENT OF UTAH IS SUBJECT TO JURISDICTION
IN UTAH COURTS FOR REDRESS OF THAT INJURY.
In the present action, plaintiff's complaint alleged
that the defendants made intentionally false accusations to
California law enforcement authorities of criminal conduct on
her part, knowing she was residing in Utah, for the purpose of
subjecting her to arrest in Utah and prosecution in
California.

After the California criminal charges were

dismissed, plaintiff brought this action for malicious
prosecution and defamation.

The court below dismissed for lack

of personal jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(3) (Rep.Vol. 9 1992)
provides that nonresidents submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of Utah's courts by "the causing of any injury
within this state . . .".

The legislature has provided that

Utah's long-arm statute "should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution."
(Rep. Vol. 9 1992).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22

Our Supreme Court has emphasized that in

accordance with the legislature's policy declaration, "the
protection afforded by Utah courts must be extended to the
fullest extent allowed by due process of law."

Synergistics v.

Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 1106, (Utah 1985).
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In this case, the defendants intentionally fabricated
a false accusation of criminal conduct on the part of the
plaintiff, intending that she be prosecuted in California.

At

the time they did so, they knew she was a Utah resident and
that their false allegations would, of necessity, cause her
damage here and involve Utah authorities in the process of
having her arrested and returned to California to face the
charges.

This conduct is more than sufficient to establish the

defendants' minimum contacts with Utah necessary to support
personal jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court has held,
unequivocally, that a non-resident of the forum state who
intentionally acts to cause injury in the forum state to a
resident of that state has acted in a manner which warrants the
exercise of jurisdiction by the forum.

In Calder v. Jones, 465

U.S. 783 (1984), the court held that defendants who resided in
and acted in Florida, but whose conduct was intended to injure
the plaintiff in California, were subject to jurisdiction in
California.

While defendants in this action suggested below

that the Court relied on other matters in reaching its decision
in Calder, the Court itself made its holding very clear.
We hold that jurisdiction over petitioners
in California is proper because of their
intentional conduct in Florida calculated to
cause injury to respondent in California.
465 U.S. at 791.
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The court rejected the notion that a defendant could
avoid jurisdiction of the courts of the very state where he had
intended to inflict a tortious injury.
An individual injured in California need not
go to Florida to seek redress from persons
who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly
cause the injury in California.
465 U.S. at 790.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in interpreting
Colorado's long-arm provision, relied upon Calder in holding
that a defendant who has no contacts with the forum state
except the commission of an intentional tort which causes
injury in that state, has no due process objection to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the forum.

In Burt v. Board of

Regents of University of Nebraska, 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir.
1985), the plaintiff alleged that he was libeled when the
Chairman of the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at the
University of Nebraska, a Dr. Connolly, wrote an unfavorable
letter to a Colorado hospital in response to its inquiry about
Dr. Burt, the plaintiff.

Dr. Connolly filed a motion to

dismiss with an affidavit asserting that he essentially had no
contacts with Colorado whatsoever.

In reversing the District

Court, the Court of Appeals held that the intentional injury
inflicted in Colorado was sufficient for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction.
Taking Dr. Burt's allegations as true, which
we must do on a motion to dismiss, we hold
no due process notions of fairness are
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violated by requiring one who intentionally
libels another to answer for the truth of
his statements in any state where the libel
causes harm to the victim.
757 F.2d at 245.
Utah's long-arm statute has been held to permit
exercise of personal jurisdiction for intentional torts when
injury is caused in Utah.

In Berret v. Life Ins. Co. of the

Southwest, 623 F.Supp. 946 (D. Utah 1985), Judge Greene noted
that Utah's statute applied to injuries which occur in the
state, without regard to where the tortious act occurs, and
that due process provides no bar to the exercise of
jurisdiction when the defendant intended injury to a forum
resident.

Judge Greene noted that the Supreme Court has

repeatedly acknowledged that a minimum contacts analysis
"properly focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the
forum and the litigation."

623 F.Supp. at 951 (quoting Keeton

v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 [1984]).

In referring to

this analysis as undertaken by the Supreme Court, Judge Greene
stated that:
In Keeton, the Court further indicated that
the "fairness" of requiring a defendant who
is not a resident of the forum state to
appear in the forum depends in part on the
expressed public policy interest of the
forum state, noting the particular interest
of a forum state in connection with tort
claims;
A state has an especial interest
in exercising judicial jurisdiction
over those who commit torts within its
territory. This is because torts
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involve wrongful conduct which a state
seeks to deter, and against which it
attempts to afford protection, by
providing that a tortfeasor shall be
liable for damages which are the
proximate result of his tort.
In this case, a strong public policy of
the state of Utah is embodied in its longarm statute for redress of tortious acts
which cause injury in this state.
623 F.Supp. at 951 (citations omitted).
The forum's interest in having its tort laws given
effect, coupled with the defendants' acts of intentionally
causing injury to a forum resident, are sufficient to permit
exercise of jurisdiction in litigation arising directly from
the injurious acts.

In Frontier Federal Savings & Loan v.

Nat'l Hotel Corp., 675 F.Supp. 1293 (D. Utah 1987), Judge
Greene reiterated that in an intentional tort case arising from
an injury suffered in the forum state, the defendant must
reasonably antitipate being called to respond in the forum, and
due process considerations are satisfied when the forum
exercises jurisdiction.

This reasoning has been repeatedly

adopted by both state and federal courts across the nation.
stated in Coblentz GMC/Freightliner v. General Motors Corp.,
724 F.Supp. 1364 (M.D. Ala. 1989),
when the origin of a deliberate,
nonfortuitous tort is in one state (or, as
in the case at hand, a foreign country) and
the intended injury to a recognized victim
is in another state, the tortfeasor has
affirmatively established minimum contacts
with the state in which the injury occurred,
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As

if the tortfeasor knew at the time it
committed the alleged tort that the victim
would be injured in that state.
724 F.Supp. at 1369.

See also, Brainerd v. Governors of

University of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1989); Duke v.
Young, 496 So.2d 37 (Ala. 1986).
Abuse of the judicial system of one state, such as
that engaged in by the defendants in this case, can subject a
party to jurisdiction in a different state if the party intends
his actions to have consequences in the other state.

For

example, in Lake v Lake, 817 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1987), an
attorney who improperly obtained an ex-parte child custody
order in California, knowing and intending that it would be
used by authorities in Idaho to remove a child from his
father's custody, was held to have subjected himself to
personal jurisdiction in Idaho.

The Court held that

Idaho could properly exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant "whose only 'contact'
with the forum state is the 'purposeful
direction of a foreign act having effect in
the forum state."
817 F.2d at 1423 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Calder,
supra, it had been held that a resident of one state who
improperly initiates legal proceedings which ultimately result
in damage to a resident of a different state has no due process
objection to having to defend his actions in the state where
the injured party resides.

In Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d

-8-

490 (5th Cir. 1981), the Court held that a Georgia lawyer who
improperly caused courts in both Georgia and Louisiana to issue
process against a Louisiana resident which ultimately led to
the arrest and detention of the Louisiana resident was subject
to personal jurisdiction in Louisiana.

The "defendant-directed

conduct" occurring in Louisiana which he was responsible for
initiating in Georgia was held to be a sufficient contact with
the forum to overcome any due process concerns.
While the defendants have previously characterized
Ms. Bryant's presence in Utah as a "fortuitous" circumstance,
the simple fact is that when they made their false and
malicious charges against her, they knew she was a Utah
resident and knew that if they were successful in causing her
injury, that injury would be suffered in Utah.
CONCLUSION
The activity in which defendants engaged which
subjects them to personal jurisdiction in Utah is very simply
stated—they chose to intentionally injure a Utah resident.

It

has been universally recognized that such intentional conduct
towards a known and intended victim is a sufficient contact
with the victim's state of residence to make it a proper forum
for the redress of the victim's injury, and due process is
fully satisfied by making the tortfeasor defend his actions in
the location where they caused the very injury intended.
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Accordingly, the judgment below should be reversed and the case
remanded for disposition on the merits.
DATED this /7/i

day of February, 1993.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By fr. MJ^J&

M. David Eckers!
Attorneys for Appelant
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ADDENDDM

Utah Code Ann., § 78-27-22:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative
determination, that the public interest demands the state
provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against
nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal
contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens
entitled to the state's protection. This legislative action is
deemed necessary because of technological progress which has
substantially increased the flow of commence betwen the several
states resulting in increased interaction between persons of
this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum
protection to citizens of this state, should be applied so as
to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24:
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, whether
or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts,
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
claim arising from:
(1) the transaction of any business within this state;
(2) contracting to suppy services or goods in this
state;
(3) the causing of any injury within this state
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real
estate situated in this state;
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or
risk located within this state at the time of contracting;
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the marital
relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent
departure from the state; or the commission in this state of
the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the
defendant had no control; or
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under Title 78,
Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the purpose of
establishing responsibility for child support.

AMENDMENT XIV
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

